Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself.
C. Self, philosophy the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Colin McGinn on I, Ego, Self - Dictionary of Arguments
I 79 f I/McGinn: can be understood as that which gives unity to the states of consciousness. Cf. >apprehension. Question: What is the nature of this unit, by what get my states of consciousness mine and yours yours? The philosophical problem is that we cannot specify what is actually a self. >Self. I 81f I/self/McGinn: is excluded from the area of uncomplicated space filling by the close relationship with the consciousness. Through that the relationship with the body gets problematic. Self/I/McGinn: we do not have sensibility, with respect to which the selves (immediately) present themselves separately from each other. E.g. I can see that your body is different from the other, but I cannot see in the same way that you are different from it. Confidence/I/McGinn: another difficulty: the I is also systematically transcendent in the acts of self-consciousness. The thinking instance acts as a subject and can never merely be the object. So even if the reflective I and the reflected I are the same, I can never resign. But just in my being a subject is my nature. There is also no guarantee that the subject retains its essential characteristics, when it turns into the object. ... Therefore we cannot perceive it as something that belongs to the same area as the (mereological) sum of the parts of the body, as if it was composed in an understandable way of the same material as the body. (CALM: Combinatorial atomism with lawlike mappings). >Terminology/McGinn. I 96f I/McGinn: The I is not composed of its mental states. In some way the I transcended its own mental states. >Consciousness, >Mind, >Mental states. But then there must be something that triggers this ontological transition. So instructions must be encoded in the genes for the production of I from living cell tissue. It may be that our concept of the person is an indefinable analytical basic concept, but the things themselves need something like an inner natural structure and a construction method. Because there can be no difference in terms of person-likeness, which would not be based on physical difference . I 104 I/consciousness/Intention/McGinn: are inextricably linked to a formidable tradition. The Self is seen as the origin of intention, the states of consciousness as the main vehicles of intention. McGinnVsTradition: but to realize that correlations exist, you do not have to accept an indissoluble link. --- II 181 I/self/McGinn: E.g. Assuming aliens change our nature and turn us into couch potatoes, to which the planet does not matter. We only have a preference for soap operas. Question: Can we be sure, that we are still ourselves? Did the aliens not simply replace you by themselves? Question: When is a cluster of cells an I? >Personality. _____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
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> Counter arguments against McGinn
> Counter arguments in relation to I, Ego, Self
